

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01
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P R 151552Z APR 77
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2093
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS
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AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0197

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO NAC MINISTERS

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AD HOC GROUP REPORT ON CURRENT
STATUS OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TO BE SENT TO THE NAC FOR THE
MAY NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING. IT WAS APPROVED BY THE
AD HOC GROUP ON APRIL 15, 1977.

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BEGIN TEXT:

I. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

1. THIS REPORT BY THE AD HOC GROUP ON THE VIENNA
NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS COVERS
THE PERIOD 1 DECEMBER 1976 THROUGH THE CONCLUSION OF THE

ELEVENTH ROUND OF THE TALKS ON 15 APRIL 1977.

2. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THIS PERIOD WAS THE DISCUSSION OF DATA AND DEFINITIONS WITH THE EAST. ON 15 DECEMBER 1976, THE WEST TABLED DATA VALID AS OF 1 JANUARY 1976 ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE MILITARY MANPOWER OF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, WITH THE AGREED EXCEPTION OF THE NAVY. THIS WESTERN MOVE FOLLOWED THE TABLING BY THE EAST IN JUNE 1976 OF DATA FOR WARSAW PACT FORCES. THIS EASTERN DATA SHOWED A SUBSTANTIAL DISCREPANCY (ABOUT 176,000 MEN) BETWEEN EASTERN FIGURES AND WESTERN ESTIMATES OF THE MANPOWER OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES. THE EAST HAD REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF THIS DISCREPANCY UNTIL THE WEST TABLED REVISED AND UPDATED FIGURES.

3. DISCUSSION OF DATA WITH THE EAST BEGAN IN JANUARY 1977. ON WESTERN INITIATIVE, IT HAS CENTERED ON AN INTENSIVE EXAMINATION BY THE TWO SIDES OF THE CRITERIA USED BY EACH IN COMPILING THEIR RESPECTIVE FIGURES FOR THEIR OWN FORCES. THE OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE EASTERN AND WESTERN COUNT OF WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER. SO FAR, HOWEVER, ONLY ONE MINOR DISCREPANCY HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED. THE EAST HAS CONTENDED UP TO NOW THAT (A) IT HAS INCLUDED IN ITS DATA ALL ACTIVE DUTY WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER; AND (B) THAT SINCE IT HAS FOLLOWED THESE WESTERN STANDARDS AS TO WHAT PERSONNEL SHOULD BE COUNTED, WESTERN ESTIMATES MUST BE WRONG.

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4. THE AD HOC GROUP HAS CONCLUDED THAT TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE WESTERN CHALLENGE OF EASTERN DATA, WHICH IT IS STRONGLY IN THE INTEREST OF THE WEST TO DO, THE NEED HAS ARISEN TO MAKE MORE SPECIFIC THE DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES AND DATA. TO THIS EFFECT, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES PROPOSED THE TABLING OF DATA ON US AND SOVIET MANPOWER IN THE AREA. THE EAST REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL AND COUNTERED BY PROPOSING THE TABLING OF DATA ON THE MANPOWER OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT. BOTH EAST AND WEST HAVE STATED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE PROPOSALS WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE REDUCTION APPROACHES OF EITHER SIDE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, ON MARCH 24, 1977, THE AD HOC GROUP REPORTED TO THE NAC THAT IT WAS HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT THE COUNCIL DECIDE SOON WHAT THE NEXT WESTERN STEP SHOULD BE.

5. THE AD HOC GROUP CONSIDERS THE MOST URGENT REQUIREMENT OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IS FOR THE ALLIES TO REACH AGREEMENT ON HOW BEST TO PROSECUTE FURTHER THE WESTERN EFFORT IN VIENNA TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN DATA ON WARSAW PACT MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS

AND TO INDUCE THE EAST TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE SIGNIFICANT
EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER.

II. DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE ROUND

A. THE DATA ISSUE

6. ON DECEMBER 15, 1976, THE WEST TABLED DATA ON THE
NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE MILITARY MANPOWER OF WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. AS APPROVED BY THE
NAC, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE INFORMED THAT: (A) THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF UNIFORMED ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY GROUND FORCE
PERSONNEL OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS
WAS 731,000 AS OF JANUARY 1, 1976. (B) THE COMBINED TOTAL
NUMBER OF UNIFORMED ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY GROUND AND AIR FORCE
PERSONNEL OF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA OF
REDUCTIONS WAS 921,000 MEN AS OF JANUARY 1, 1976. WESTERN
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REPRESENTATIVES SPECIFIED THE COUNTING RULES USED BY THE WEST
IN COMPILING ITS DATA. THEY STATED THAT THE WEST HAD INCLUDED
ALL ACTIVE DUTY WESTERN MILITARY PERSONNEL BOTH IN ITS FIGURES ON
THE MILITARY MANPOWER OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND IN ITS
ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT MANPOWER, AND ASKED THE EAST
WHAT COUNTING RULES THE EAST HAD USED IN COMPILING ITS TOTALS
OF WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER AND HOW THE EAST HAD APPLIED
THEM TO WARSAW PACT FORCES.

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2094

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INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS
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AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
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AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY ANKARA BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK BY POUCH

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FROM US REP MBFR

7. UPON THE RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN JANUARY 1977, EASTERN REPS MOVED WITHOUT DELAY TO ENGAGE IN A DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES AND DATA AS PROPOSED BY THE WEST. SINCE THEN, BOTH SIDES HAVE EXCHANGED A DETAILED SERIES OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS CONCERNING THE MANPOWER DATA PROVIDED BY THE OTHER.

8. THE OBJECTIVE OF ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAS BEEN TO ESTABLISH THE REASONS FOR THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN FIGURES TABLED BY THE EAST LAST JUNE AND THE LATEST COMPARABLE NATO ESTIMATES FOR
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WARSAW PACT AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. AS WAS NOTED IN THE LAST AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO MINISTERS, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE EASTERN TOTAL FOR PACT MANPOWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE CURRENT NATO ESTIMATE OF THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THESE FORCES IS ABOUT 176,000 MEN.

9. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE CONDUCTED THEIR CHALLENGE TO EASTERN DATA ON TWO FRONTS. THEY HAVE PRESENTED A DETAILED SERIES OF FACTUAL AND SPECIFIC QUESTIONS INTENDED TO IDENTIFY THE PRECISE CONTENT OF EASTERN MANPOWER FIGURES. THIS PERSISTENT QUESTIONING HAS NOT ELICITED EASTERN ANSWERS WHICH WOULD SERVE TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN FIGURES FOR WARSAW PACT FORCES AND WESTERN ESTIMATES, EXCEPT TO IDENTIFY ONE SPECIFIC EXCLUSION BY THE EAST OF A FORCE ELEMENT INCLUDED IN THE NATO ESTIMATE OF WARSAW PACT FORCES. EASTERN REPS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY HAD ALLOCATED TO THE NAVY, AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED FROM THEIR WARSAW PACT COUNT, THE POLISH SEA LANDING DIVISION WHICH IN NATO ESTIMATES NUMBERS SOME 4,700 MEN AND IS INCLUDED UNDER GROUND FORCES.

10. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE ALSO CITED A NUMBER OF INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN PREVIOUS EASTERN STATEMENTS IMPLYING

A SUBSTANTIAL MANPOWER DISPARITY IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FAVORING THE EAST AND CURRENT EASTERN ASSERTIONS OF ROUGH EQUALITY BETWEEN THE TROOP STRENGTHS OF THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO IN CENTRAL EUROPE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE EAST EARLIER VIGOROUSLY ARGUED THAT THE REDUCTIONS TO PARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER THE WEST PROPOSED WOULD UPSET THE OVERALL EAST-WEST BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE AREA. BUT THIS ARGUMENT ONLY MAKES SENSE IF THE EAST RECOGNIZED THAT IT HAD A SIZEABLE SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA. IF MILITARY MANPOWER WERE IN FACT AT PARITY, THE EAST COULD NOT ARGUE THAT MAINTENANCE OF PARITY AT A LOWER LEVEL COULD CHANGE THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

11. ALTHOUGH EASTERN REPS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO EXPLAIN
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THESE INCONSISTENCIES CONVINCINGLY, THAT FACT HAS NOT CAUSED THEM TO ALTER THEIR CLAIMS THAT THE MILITARY MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IS ROUGHLY EQUAL, AS ALLEGEDLY DEMONSTRATED BY THE FIGURES TABLED BY BOTH SIDES.

12. THE EAST HAS CONTINUED TO CONTEND THAT: (A) IT HAS INCLUDED IN ITS DATA ALL ACTIVE DUTY WARSAW PACT AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS; (B) IT HAS COMPILED THAT DATA USING WESTERN STANDARDS OF INCLUDING ALL ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL AND OF EXCLUDING ALL CIVILIANS, RESERVISTS AND MEMBERS OF UNIFORMED ORGANIZATIONS EQUIPPED WITH WEAPONS SUCH AS BORDER GUARDS AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES; AND (C) THE SOURCES OF ANY DISCREPANCY MUST THEREFORE REST IN ERRONEOUS INFORMATION OR PROCEDURES EMPLOYED BY NATO IN ARRIVING AT ITS ESTIMATES FOR WARSAW PACT FORCES.

13. IT IS STRONGLY IN THE INTEREST OF THE WEST NOT TO LEAVE THESE EASTERN CONTENTIONS UNCHALLENGED. TO DO SO COULD SERIOUSLY ERODE THE AUTHORITY OF THE WESTERN POSITION, WHICH CENTERS ON THE RATIONALE THAT SIGNIFICANT GROUND FORCE DISPARITIES FAVORING THE EAST HAVE TO BE REDRESSED THROUGH ESTABLISHMENT OF PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER AND REDUCTION OF THE EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

14. THE AD HOC GROUP IS OF THE VIEW THAT, IN ORDER TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE WESTERN CHALLENGE OF EASTERN DATA CLAIMS, THE TIME HAS COME TO MAKE THE DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES AND DATA MORE SPECIFIC SO AS TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE EAST TO STAND ON UNSUBSTANTIATED ASSERTIONS.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2095
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INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS
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15. IN MARCH 1977, THE AD HOC GROUP REQUESTED, AND THE COUNCIL GRANTED, AUTHORIZATION TO PROPOSE TO THE EAST THAT MANPOWER DATA FOR US AND SOVIET FORCES BE PUT ON THE TABLE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE BASIC NEGOTIATING POSITION OF EITHER SIDE. IMMEDIATELY UPON INTRODUCTION OF THIS PROPOSAL, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES REJECTED IT. THEY ARGUED THAT IT WAS ILLOGICAL SINCE PARTICIPANTS WERE AT PRESENT EXAMINING OVERALL MANPOWER FIGURES FOR NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES AND THOSE FIGURES WERE, IN TURN, MADE UP ON FNATIONAL FIGURES FOR ALL
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DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THUS, IT WAS THEIR VIEW THAT SPECIFICATION OF US AND SOVIET DATA ALONE WOULD NOT AID IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE SOURCES OF DATA DISCREPANCIES. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES PROPOSED THAT SEPARATE MANPOWER DATA FOR EACH

DIRECT PARTICIPANT BE TABLED SIMULTANEOUSLY, IN WHICH CASE, THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS US AND SOVIET FIGURES FIRST.

16. FURTHER WESTERN EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE EAST TO BEGIN A CONSIDERATION OF DISAGGREGATED DATA WITH FIGURES FOR US AND SOVIET FORCES ALONE HAVE MET AND ARE LIKELY TO MEET IN THE FUTURE WITH A SIMILARLY NEGATIVE EASTERN REACTION. IN REPEATING THEIR COUNTERPROPOSAL, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE STATED THAT TABLING SEPARATE NATIONAL MANPOWER TOTALS FOR EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE BASIC NEGOTIATING POSITION OF EITHER SIDE.

B. OTHER NEGOTIATING ISSUES

17. AS REGARDS THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS HAVE CONTINUED TO PRESS THE EAST TO ADOPT THE WESTERN DECEMBER 1975 PROPOSALS. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE STRESSED THAT, UNLIKE THE EAST, THE WEST HAD SUBSTANTIALLY AUGMENTED ITS ORIGINAL POSITION WITH ITS PROPOSALS OF 16 DECEMBER 1975, WHICH INCLUDED AN OFFER TO REDUCE, AND TO LIMIT AT THEIR RESIDUAL LEVELS, A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF CERTAIN US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND PROVIDED FOR AN ENDURING LIMITATION ON AIR MANPOWER THROUGH PLACING IT UNDER THE COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING.

18. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SHOWN THAT THE DECEMBER 1975 WESTERN PROPOSALS SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED THE OUTCOME TO THE NEGOTIATIONS INITIALLY ENVISAGED IN THE WESTERN PROGRAM IN A WAY THAT LEFT NO ROOM FOR DOUBT THAT WHAT THE WEST WAS NOW OFFERING WAS AT LEAST EQUAL TO WHAT IT REQUIRED OF THE EAST IN RETURN. THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO CALL UPON THE EAST TO GIVE THE POSITIVE AND SERIOUS RESPONSE MERITED BY THE
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WEST'S DECEMBER 1975 PROPOSALS SO AS TO OPEN THE WAY AT LAST TO GENUINE PROGRESS TOWARD A FIRST AGREEMENT.

19. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ALSO REMINDED THE EAST ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT THE TIME IS OPPORTUNE TO BEGIN JOINT EXAMINATION OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES; IN PARTICULAR OF THE STABILIZING MEASURES NECESSARY TO REGULATE THE ACTIVITIES OF RESIDUAL US AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA FOLLOWING THE REDUCTIONS OF THOSE FORCES IN A FIRST PHASE. IN RESPONSE, THERE HAVE BEEN SOME INCONCLUSIVE INDICATIONS OF EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THIS TOPIC AND TO PRESENT THEIR VIEWS ON IT.

20. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CONTINUED TO URGE AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE EAST'S 19 FEBRUARY 1976 PROPOSAL. THEY HAVE MAINTAINED THAT AN AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS PROPOSED BY THE WEST WOULD UPSET THE EXISTING FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN THE

AREA, WHICH THEY CHARACTERIZED AS BEING ONE OF QUOTE
APPROXIMATE EQUALITY UNQUOTE, TO THE DETRIMENT OF EASTERN
SECURITY. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE RENEWED THEIR CLAIM
THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD INCLUDE ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND
ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR
SYSTEMS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS AND SHOULD LEAD TO NATIONAL CEILINGS. THEY ALSO
CONTINUED TO CRITICIZE THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
FOR THEIR REFUSAL TO ASSUME FROM THE OUTSET COMMITMENTS REGARDING
THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF THEIR PHASE 2 REDUCTIONS.

21. OVER THE SAME PERIOD, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE
REVIVED AND ENERGETICALLY PRESSED THE EASTERN PROPOSAL THAT
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AGREE NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL
STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES FOR THE DURATION OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS. THEY HAVE CLAIMED THAT EARLIER WESTERN OBJECTIONS --
NAMELY, THE ABSENCE OF DATA AND CONTRACTUALIZATION OF AN EASTERN
MANPOWER SUPERIORITY -- TO THIS PROPOSAL HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED
BY THE TABLING OF EASTERN DATA SHOWING THAT MILITARY MANPOWER
IN THE AREA OF WARSAW PACT AND NATO FORCES IS ROUGHLY EQUAL.

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IN RESPONSE, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE REVIEWED IN
DETAIL THE REASONS WHY ANY TEMPORARY MANPOWER
LIMITATION MUST BE LINKED TO A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREE-
MENT WHICH WOULD NOT CONTRACTUALIZE EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN
MILITARY MANPOWER. THEY HAVE ALSO NOTED THAT A NO-INCREASE
COMMITMENT REQUIRES AGREEMENT ON DATA AND THAT, BECAUSE THERE IS
DISAGREEMENT ON DATA, A FREEZE IS NOT FEASIBLE.

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Message Attributes

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Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO NAC MINISTERS FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AD HOC GROUP REPORT ON CURRENT STATUS OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TO BE SENT TO THE NAC
TAGS: PARM, XT, XH, NATO, NAC, MBFR
To: STATE DOD
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